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In this paper we examine the relationship between ownership differences and small firms’ financial 
policies using a survey of U.S. companies. The study finds that financial policies differ according to 
the type of ownership (private versus public) and by the ownership differences (family-owned, closely-
held, or widely-held) within the private firms. The differences are in the ownership concentration, 
relative importance of various sources of capital, debt characteristics (sources of debt financing, debt 
maturity, and debt cost). A multiple regression equation estimated in the paper provides evidence 
relating to cross-sectional variations in debt ratios of small firms. The paper offers information 
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asymmetry, illiquidity, and agency cost explanations for the observed differences in ownership and 
financial policies of small firms. 
 
I. Introduction 
Small firms are by far a vast majority of for-profit business enterprises in the United States, and 
most small firms are privately-held. They differ from large, publicly-held corporations in several 
aspects relating to liquidity of corporate securities, informational asymmetry, credit risks, external 
monitoring, and agency problems. For these reasons, it may not be appropriate to apply the findings 
from research on large, public corporations in toto to explain the ownership differences and financial 
policies in small firms. Our research findings are intended to bridge the gap in our understanding of 
small business finance with the findings from our survey. The paper emphasizes ownership differences 
in rationalizing the observed differences in small firms’ financial policies – sources of capital, debt 
structure, and lease financing. It also provides comparisons between private and public firms in those 
dimensions. 
The agency problems in large corporations have been widely discussed in the financial literature, 
e.g., see Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), Smith and Warner 
(1979), Easterbrook (1984), Barnea et al. (1985), and Myers (1977). Managers of large corporations, 
with very little or no equity interests in the firm but with control over the firm's resources, have 
opportunities to expropriate wealth from equity holders at large through shirking, excessive perk 
consumption, and expense preference behavior. Agency problems between stockholders and 
bondholders arise from several sources such as, excessive dividend payment, asset substitution, claim 
dilution, and under-investment. Private firms also face agency problems, but they are quite different 
from those encountered in public companies. Prior studies, for example, Mace (1948), Hand, Lloyd, 
and Rogow (1982), Peterson (1984), Petit and Singer (1985), Ford (1988), Bathala and Mukherjee 
(1996), Berger and Udell (1995, 1997), Myers (2000), and Scherr and Hulbert (2001), have examined 
the various facets of small business finance and offered explanations in terms of agency costs, 
informational asymmetry, and corporate governance. Our survey provides a conduit for empirical 
validation of various issues espoused in those studies. 
Most private firms are small and conflicts of interest are primarily between "inside" and "outside" 
contributors of capital. The conflicts arise due to divergence of interests between the two groups with 
respect to control of the firm’s affairs, cash-flow rights, and minority interest of stockholdings. 
Typically, the major owners of small firms are also their top managers. Those with minority stakes, 
having little control over the firm’s affairs, tend to be in a disadvantageous position. Furthermore, 
stockholders face potential illiquidity problems because of the small number of investors, lack of a 
ready market for the firm's stock, and information limitations. Important mechanisms for disciplining 
the managers of large corporations, i.e., discipline from stock market and takeover mechanism are not 
available to the stockholders of private firms. In addition to these limitations, major stockholders and 
their family members are likely to dominate the boards devoid of control or monitoring from outsiders. 
As Mace (1948) suggests, the board's primary purpose in small firms is to fulfill the statutory 
requirements and managing group dynamics rather than monitoring the top management. These 
various limitations in monitoring and control of small firms’ affairs have important implications for 
the sources and costs of different sources of capital, especially debt capital.  
Myers (2000) models the inside versus outside equity financing in firms when cash flows and asset 
values are not verifiable. His arguments hold especially true for private firms in which investors have 
enforceable property rights but are unable to restrict insiders from capturing the cash flow for their 
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own benefit. In such situations, for raising outside equity, insiders must co-invest and pay dividends in 
order to attract capital from outside investors. It would be interesting to see if the survey data show 
high equity contributions from insiders of private firms. 
In view of the high monitoring costs, informational asymmetries, and the above stated Myers’ 
contentions, outside equity becomes a scarce resource to private firms. Therefore, primary sources of 
capital for small firms would be in the form of internally generated funds and capital supplied by the 
major stockholders as loans/additional equity. External sources of capital are likely to be from those 
who possess information and monitoring advantages, for example, trade credit, bank loans, and loans 
from friends and relatives. To some extent venture capitalists, Small Business Administration (SBA), 
and Small Business Investment Corporations (SBIC) may provide capital, especially during the early 
phases of small firms. 
Although all privately-held businesses have a common thread as it pertains to the lack of ready 
marketability of their securities, they differ in terms of ownership structure, corporate governance, and 
sources of capital, particularly debt versus equity. The ownership of small firms can vary from one 
family owning the entire stock to a wide ownership. In sales, they vary from a few million to over half-
a-billion dollars in sales. The differences in ownership structure and firm size can have a significant 
bearing on the company’s ability to raise external capital and the risks faced by capital providers. In 
this paper, we primarily analyze the ownership differences in privately-held companies and relate them 
to the differences in sources of capital, debt structure, and lease financing. Additionally, we make 
comparisons with the publicly-held companies using the information obtained from the same survey. 
We also examine cross-sectional variations in debt ratios of small firms. Specifically, the findings 
from our survey will provide answers to the following questions: (1) How do small firms differ in their 
ownership structure? (2) Do ownership differences translate to differences in sources of capital and 
financial policies of small firms? (3) How do small firms’ debt structures vary by source, maturity, 
cost, and security? (5) Are debt and lease financing substitutes or complementary? and (6) What 
factors explain cross-sectional variations in debt ratios of small firms? These questions are answered 
from the standpoint of arguments in agency costs, informational asymmetry, and liquidity 
considerations. 
Our study is unique in several ways. First, it draws sample from the Standard & Poor’s Directory 
of Corporations which is a highly credible source for the universe of corporations in the U.S. Second, 
the survey responses received from both privately-owned and publicly-owned companies enable us to 
make insightful comparisons between the two groups. Third, few past studies on small business 
finance have provided in-depth analyses of ownership and financial policy differences as much as our 
study does. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data and the 
methodology in the paper. Section III discusses survey results. Lastly, Section IV provides conclusions 
and implications from our research. 
 
II. Data and Methodology 
The data for this research were gathered using a survey instrument. The Standard & Poor’s 1997 
Directory of Corporations (Vol.1) is the source of names and addresses of the corporations surveyed in 
this research. The S&P Directory includes corporations (public and private), non-profit firms, 
charitable institutions, and trusts. From each page of the S&P Directory we chose the first firm in the 
first column. Next, we removed from the list all types of entities other than private and public 
corporations from the list (charities, universities, non-profit hospitals, etc.). This procedure resulted in 
a sample of 2,870 companies – 2,251 private firms (78.4 percent) and 619 public firms (21.6 percent). 
  
 
32 
 
The survey was anonymous and the questionnaire was not marked in order to ensure anonymity of 
responding firms. The survey instrument was four pages long and it sought information on 
ownership/governance issues, shareholder agreements, sale/transfer of ownership, and financial 
policies. 
The survey questionnaires were mailed in the month of August, 1998. A total of 275 firms 
provided responses for a response rate of 9.6%. An additional 75 envelopes were returned to us as 
undeliverable. Of the responses received 253 were usable. The response rate, although somewhat low, 
looks typical of surveys involving small firms. The President or CEO of the company provided as 
much as 74.5% of the responses, but the proportion of responses provided by them is higher for 
publicly owned firms (78%) than for privately owned firms (61%).  However, from the comparisons 
presented below, we note that the responding firms are representative of the firms in the population. 
Further, the final sample size is large enough for the purpose of the statistical methods (parametric and 
non-parametric) employed in the paper and making inferences about the data. 
Out of the total of 253 responses, 202 (79.8%) are from privately-owned companies and 51 
(20.2%) are from publicly-owned companies. This distribution is very close to the distribution of firms 
in the mailing list (2,870 companies) – 2,251 private firms (78.4%) and 619 public firms (21.6%). The 
distribution of sample firms according to their business background is as follows: 130 firms (52%) are 
in manufacturing sector; 26 firms (10.4%) are in trading sector (wholesale and retail); 25 firms (10%) 
in agriculture, construction and mining, and 19 firms (7.6%) in service sector. The distribution of 
sample firms according to sales are as follows: 153 firms (61.7%) have sales revenues of $25 million 
or less. Of this, 139 are private firms(90.8%) and 14 (9.2%) are public firms. We find 17 firms (6.8%) 
with sales over $500 million, of which 3 are private firms (17.6%) and 14 (82.4%) are public. In terms 
of company size measured as the number of employees, a total of 138 firms (55%) have 100 or fewer 
employees. However, 125 of those firms are private (90.6%) whereas only 13 firms (9.4%) are public. 
At the other extreme, in the category of firms with employees of 500 or more, there are a total of 41 
firms (16.3% of total respondents) of which 13 firms (31.7%) are private and 28 firms (68.3%) are 
public. Overall, sales and number of employees seem to correlate highly. 
The data gathered from our survey are in different forms: (a) use of a Lichert scale (for example, 1 
= Least important; ---- 5 = Most important), (b) by a range of values (for example, 1 = Zero% debt 
ratio; ----- 6 = Debt ratio over 75%), (c) identification by a classification scheme (for example, 1 = 
Short-term debt; 2 = Medium-term debt, and 3 = Long-term debt), and (d) continuous measurement 
(for example, Number of shareholders in the firm and percentage of shares owned by the CEO). The 
classifications or rankings were appropriately used to capture the differences according to the needs of 
statistical approaches used in the study. 
For empirical analysis, we use Chi-Square tests and a multiple regression model. In Chi-Square 
analysis, a univariate approach, we test the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the set 
of observed frequencies and the set of expected frequencies. With this approach, we examine (1) if 
small firms differ in their ownership structures and ownership concentrations and (2) if those 
differences relate to various financial policy attributes (debt ratio, source of debt, debt maturity, cost of 
debt, and debt security). For the firms that are privately-owned, we have responses large enough to 
examine the differences according their ownership structure: family-owned, closely-held, and publicly-
held. For publicly-owned companies, this classification is less relevant even though we have received 
responses to that effect. In addition to the comparisons within the sub-groups among privately-owned 
firms, we make comparisons between privately-owned and publicly-owned firms. For public firms, the 
ownership sub-groups are ignored to keep the analysis centered on privately-owned firms and also 
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because of too many cell sizes falling below five. 
In our second approach, multiple regression analysis, we examine cross-sectional variations in debt 
ratios by estimating a regression equation with debt ratio as the dependent variable and a set of 
explanatory variables reflecting dimensions such as ownership differences, alternate sources of 
financing, firm size, and the firm type (private or public). We find these two approaches to be valid 
statistical techniques for the data at hand and the inferences we intend to make. However, there are a 
couple of limitations that we would like to point out up-front. First, in Chi-Square analysis, some 
frequency tables have a few cells with the number of observations fewer than five. In such instances, 
we were warned that Chi-Square test may not be valid. Second, in multiple regression analysis, many 
variables are discrete (for example, responses received on a Lichert scale or using a classification 
scheme to distinguish the variable of interest by multiple levels).  
 
III. Survey Results 
 The empirical analysis in the paper uses two approaches, (i) univariate analysis with Chi-Squared 
tests, and (ii) a multiple regression analysis. The data comparisons center around the ownership 
differences by classifying sample firms  into (1) family-owned (all or majority of the firm’s equity 
owned by one person or the members of a single family), (2) closely-held (majority of equity 
ownership held by a small group of families and their relatives, and (3) widely-held (no single person 
or a group holding majority ownership or controlling interest in the firm. Comparisons are also made 
between privately-owned and publicly-owned firms.  
 
Univariate Analysis 
In this section, first we present our preliminary analysis of ownership differences of the responding 
firms. Next, we provide detailed analyses of (A) Sources of Capital, (B) Lease Financing, and (C) 
Debt Structure. 
Ownership Differences: Out of a total of 201 privately-owned firms in the sample, 129 firms 
(64.2%) are family owned, 57 firms (28.4%) are closely-held, and 15 firms (7.4%) are widely-held.  
On average, the CEOs of family-owned private firms hold 57.4% of common stock compared to a 
mere 5.6% in widely-owned private firms. Between the privately-owned and publicly-owned groups, 
the CEOs of privately-owned firms possess 48.5% of equity compared to 10.4% by the CEOs of 
publicly-owned companies. Further, the CEOs in 50.4% of family-owned firms hold 50% or more of 
the company’s stock. The number of firms with CEO stockholdings over 50% decline to 30.4% in 
closely-held firms to 0% in widely-owned firms. The differences become even more distinct when we 
compare the CEO stockholdings between private and public firms. 
Another dimension of CEO stock ownership is whether or not the CEO is the largest stockholder 
in the firm. In 69.8% of family-owned firms CEO is the largest stockholder compared to only 25% of 
the widely-held firms. Between private and public firms, the CEO is the largest stockholder in 36.5% 
of the privately-owned group versus 22.5% for the publicly-owned group. The proportion of insider 
stock ownership (managers and directors) is another important measure of ownership and control 
duality in firms. In 82.1% of family-owned firms, insiders own over 50% of the firm’s common stock, 
as opposed to a mere 15.4% of firms in the widely-owned group. In case of public companies, only 
10% of the firms have insider ownership in excess of 50%.  
The duality of management and control is more pronounced in privately-owned firms (with 62.1% 
of managers holding board memberships) compared to 29.8% in public firms. Thus, there is a greater 
outside representation on boards of public firms than on boards of private firms, and private firms, 
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especially family-owned, seem to have the most concentrated power structure resulting in a limited 
monitoring and control by outsiders. This observed phenomenon of  highly concentrated board 
structures in private firms is consistent with Mace’s (1948) contention that the board’s role in such 
firms is primarily to fulfill the statutory requirements. Overall, these findings are consistent with the 
agency theory arguments and provides a validation for the existence of concentrated ownership and 
control structures as a means of controlling equity agency costs in firms. A more complete analysis of 
these ownership differences can be found in Bathala et. al. (2003).  
 
(A) Analysis of Sources of Capital 
In Table 1, we present our findings about the relative importance of various sources of capital in 
small firms. The data in the table are means of responses collected on a Lichert scale (1 = least 
importand, ....... 5 = most important). The top two sources of financing (bank finance and equity from 
owners) are the same both private and public firms. In family-owned and closely-owned groups, the 
top four rankings are the same – (1) loans/credit lines from banks, (2) equity from owners, (3) trade 
credit, and (4) loans from stockholders/directors. While trade credit is the third most important source 
of capital for family-owned and closely-held firms, it is equity from outside investors for public firms. 
Loans from stockholders and directors is a less important source of capital for public firms compared 
to its rank as the fourth most important source of capital for private firms. These findings are 
consistent with the argument that owners and those having informational/monitoring advantages tend 
to be the primary providers of capital to small firms. This is not entirely surprising as small firms, 
either private or public, are constrained by their ability to raise significant amounts of external capital. 
We anticipated small firms, especially in private ownership, to be heavy users of SBA financing and 
venture capital for supplementing their capital needs. However, the survey responses prove otherwise. 
Those two are the least important sources of capital to either private or public firms in the sample. 
 
(B) Analysis of Lease Financing 
Lease finance is an important source of capital for small firms, especially because of limited 
sources of borrowing. Among others, Mukherjee (1991) and Bathala and Mukherjee (1996), have 
addressed issues such as relative costs and benefits of leasing versus borrowing and whether leasing 
and borrowing are substitutes or complements of each other. Mukherjee’s survey of large firms 
(Fortune 500 companies) found a substitute relationship between leasing and borrowing, whereas 
Bathala and Mukherjee’s survey of small firms found them to be complements of one another. The 
question, therefore, remains unsettled and this survey provides empirical validation to explore the 
issue further. Additionally, to our best recollection, no other study has provided evidence on the 
importance of lease finance in privately-owned firms by capturing the ownership differences and also 
making a comparison between privately-owned and publicly-owned firms. 
The data in Table 2 (Panel A) are on the basis of the following classification scheme. The different 
ownership groups are as before. On the basis of the percentage of assets financed with leases, the 
groups are: 0 percent, 1-10 percent, and greater than 10 percent. This distribution provides cell sizes 
large enough for conducting the Chi-Squared tests. The data show that almost 51 percent of private 
firms do not finance their assets with lease finance compared to only 31 percent of firms belonging to 
the publicly-owned category. On the basis of the Chi-Squared statistic, the private versus public group 
difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. A vast majority of firms making use of lease 
finance seem to finance no more than 10 percent of their total assets via leasing. The proportion of 
firms using leases to finance greater than 10 percent of their assets with leases is small either in 
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privately-owned group (11 percent) or publicly-owned group (12.5 percent). The differences within  
the three groups of private firms (family-owned, closely-held, and widely-held) reveal that leasing is 
less prevalent in firms belonging to family-owned or closely-held groups relative to those in widely-
held category. The group differences among private firms is weakly significant (Chi-Squared = 8.07; 
p-value = 0.0889). 
Initially, we presumed that small firms would probably rely more on lease finance owing to their 
limited access to debt markets and more stringent covenants imposed by creditors. The data speak 
otherwise. This shows that small firms, to a large extent, are less attractive to financiers other than 
those who have on-going lending relationships and monitoring advantages (trade creditors and banks). 
Alternatively, small firms may be not finding (especially privately-owned) lease finance attractive 
enough in comparison to trade credit (a free financing source) and bank finance (with the 
accompanying advisory benefits and on-going relationships). 
Next, we examine the relationship between leasing versus borrowing to verify if they are 
substitutes or complements of each other. We do this first by examining the correlation coefficient 
between the debt ratio (percentage of total debt in the firm’s total assets) and the lease ratio 
(percentage of leased assets in the firm’s total assets) in this section. Later, we use lease ratio as an 
explanatory variable in a regression equation to examine the relationship between debt and lease 
financing. For both debt ratio and lease ratio, we use the raw data from the survey responses collected 
on a Lichert scale for this purpose. 
For private firms, the correlation coefficient between debt ratio and lease ratio is 0.29 and the p-
value of 0.0002 indicates a high statistical significance. For pubic firms, the correlation coefficient is 
even higher at 0.42 and the p-value is 0.003. The strong positive association between debt and lease 
ratios are supportive of a complementary relationship between leasing and borrowing and the evidence 
is consistent with that reported by Bathala and Mukherjee. 
 
(C) Analysis of Debt Structure 
In Table 3 we present a detailed analysis of differences in debt financing by ownership structure. 
The data show that, among privately-owned firms, ownership differences do not give rise to 
statistically significant differences in debt ratios (Panel A), sources of debt – trade credit, bank loans, 
and other sources (Panel B), and debt maturity (Panel C). This inference is drawn from the Chi-
Squared statistics and p-values reported in the table. The differences between privately-owned and 
publicly-owned firms are also not significantly different with respect to debt ratios (Panel A). 
However, privately-owned and publicly-owned companies significantly differ from each other with 
respect to debt characteristics such as sources of debt (Panel B), debt maturity (Panel C), and the cost 
of debt (Panel D).  
In Panel A, the Chi-Squared statistics suggest no significant differences in debt ratios of firms in 
different ownership groups. However, we notice that a larger proportion of firms (about 46%) in either 
private or public ownership have debt ratios of l0% or less. In contrast, the proportion of firms with 
high debt ratios (50% or greater) is slightly lower at 13.2% for private firms than 14% for public firms. 
Overall, a vast majority of firms (about 86%) in both privately-owned and publicly-owned groups have 
debt ratios of 50% or smaller. From Panel B, we observe that bank loans comprise the most important 
source of debt capital for 76.4% of privately-owned firms and 56.1% of publicly-owned firms. Trade 
credit is the second most important source of finance for 13.9% of private firms compared to 7.3% of 
public firms. As high as 36.6% of public firms rely primarily upon other sources of debt in comparison 
to a much smaller proportion (10.2%) of private firms. Within the Heavy reliance on bank loans and 
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trade credit by privately-owned firms, relative to publicly-owned firms is consistent with the 
information asymmetry and monitoring arguments. This evidence is also consistent with Johnson 
(1997) who has examined the choice between bank loans and private non-bank loans. The results from 
his study showed that bank loans are used by smaller firms as banks have the advantage of being cost-
effective monitors of firms that maintain depository relationships with them. 
In debt maturity (Panel C), we find that private firms predominantly use short-term debt. As high 
as 48.8% of private firms reported that their primary maturity structure is short-term. Only 27.8% and 
23.5% of private firms respectively indicated medium-term and long-term as the primary maturity 
structure of their debt financing. This contrasts with the maturity preferences of public firms. Long-
term debt is the primary maturity structure of public firms (38.6% firms), followed by short-term debt 
(34.1% firms), and medium-term debt (27.3% firms). The maturity differences between the different 
ownership groups of private firms are not statistically significant, but they are significantly different 
between private and public firms (Chi-Square = 4.74; p-value = 0.0934). These findings are akin to the 
agency arguments relating to firm size and debt maturity put forth by Stohs and Mauer (1996). Their 
arguments suggest that small firms can overcome the agency costs between equity and debt holders by 
diminishing the maturity structure of debt financing. The private firms in our sample are, on average, 
smaller than the public firms, and their greater use of short-term debt relative to public firms is 
consistent with the arguments of Stohs and Mauer (1996). 
The cost of debt (Panel D) varies significantly by ownership differences within the privately-
owned firms and between private and public firms. On average, 82.8% of family-owned firms and 
77.1% of closely-held private firms borrow at or above the prime rate. This contrasts with only  53.9% 
of widely-held private firms incurring debt costs at or above the prime rate. Overall, a larger 
proportion of private firms (79.1%) have borrowing costs at or above prime rate compared to a smaller 
proportion of public firms (47.6%) having to borrow at or above the prime rate.  
The opposite is true in borrowing below the prime rate – only 20.9% of private firms are able to 
borrow below the prime rate compared to a high of 52.2% for public firms. We believe that the higher 
borrowing costs for private firms are due to the informational asymmetry and illiquidity problems 
associated with them relative to public firms. Another source of variations in borrowing costs among 
small firms could be due to the differences in banking relationships of firms belonging to different 
ownership groups. Berger and Udell (1995), for example, found that firms with longer banking 
relationships pay lower interest rates. 
Debt Ratios, Debt Maturity, and Cost of Debt. If a firm that is highly levered uses more short-term 
debt, then the firm may face a liquidity crisis if it is unable to refinance the maturing debt or if its cash 
flows are insufficient for meeting the maturing obligation. Therefore, firms with high (low) debt 
leverage are more likely to use long-term (short-term) debt. In Panel E (Table 3) we examine if this 
relationship holds for small firms. Recent studies by Guedes and Opler (1996), Leland and Toft 
(1996),  and Stohs and Mauer (1996), and Scherr and Hulburt (2001) have analyzed the debt leverage 
vs. debt maturity relationships. As can be seen, among private firms, 65.5% of firms in the low-
leverage group (debt ratio <= 10%) have short-term debt as their primary maturity structure compared 
to a much smaller proportion of firms (32%) in the high-leverage group (debt ratio > 50%). In contrast, 
only 12.1% of low-leverage firms have long-term debt as their primary source of debt compared to 
24% of firms in the high-leverage group. The maturity differences between the different groups of 
private firms by debt use are statistically significant (Chi-Square = 14.09; p-value = 0.007). These 
findings are consistent with the evidence provided by Stohs and Mauer (1996) for large firms and 
Scherr and Hulburt (2001) for small firms. The debt maturity differences between private and public 
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firms were already discussed along with the results in Panel C.  
With increased use of debt leverage, a  firm’s financial risk would increase, so does its cost of 
debt. In Panel F (Table 3), we examine if there is a positive relationship between debt ratios and debt 
costs. In the case of privately-owned firms, only 29.4% of firms in the low-debt group (debt ratio <= 
10%) have their borrowing cost above the prime rate compared to a much larger proportion of firms 
(65.4%) in the high debt ratio group (debt ratio > 50%). The differences in borrowing costs for private 
firms according debt ratios are statistically significant (Chi-Square = 12.05; p-value = 0.017). From the 
results, it is apparent that financial risk is a discriminating factor for loan pricing. The borrowing costs 
also differ significantly between private and public firms (Chi-Square = 18.05; p-value = 0.0001) 
which was already discussed along with findings in Panel D. One peculiarity is that, among privately-
owned firms, the proportion of firms borrowing below the prime rate appears to be about the same 
irrespective of their differences in debt ratios. This is somewhat surprising and we suspect that lending 
below the prime rate is influenced by factors other than the financial risk differentials. Perhaps, 
borrowers with longer banking relationships are able to receive financing at lower interest rates, as 
reported in a study by Berger and Udell (1995). We are unable to verify the validity of this reasoning 
as our survey data lacks information for making such analysis. 
 
Multiple Regression Analysis 
The univariate analyses and Chi-Square tests in the previous section have provided insights into 
various facets of debt leverage by ownership differences. In this section, we employ a multiple 
regression model to identify the determinants of debt leverage in small firms. Through regression 
analysis we can examine the cross-sectional variations in debt ratios using multiple dimensions of 
explanatory variables reflecting ownership differences, alternative sources of financing, dividend 
payout, company size, age, and the firm’s class (private or public).  The estimated regression equation 
is of the following form. 
 
 
DEBTRAT = f (OWNERS,   SHLDNUM,   CEOSTOCK,   CEOEXP,   TRCREDIT,               
                                              LEASING,   SALES,   PAYOUT,   COMPAGE,   TRADING) 
 
Discussion of the Regression Model.  The definitions and measurement of variables in the 
regression equation are furnished in Table 4. All variables are from the survey responses. Many 
variables are on discrete scales but the survey responses contained multiple levels which provided 
sufficient variability in their measurement. The robustness of results from the regression model 
negates any suspicion of distortions from data limitations. The following is a discussion of the 
variables in the  regression model.  
Debt ratio (DEBTRAT) is the dependent variable in the regression equation. It is a discrete 
variable with six levels of measurement: 1 for 0% debt ratio at the low end to 6 for debt ratios over 
75%. The independent variables in the regression model reflect the ownership differences 
(OWNERS), number of shareholders (SHLDNUM); CEO attributes – % of the CEO’s stock 
ownership (CEOSTOCK) and the CEO’s total experience in the firm (CEOEXP); two alternative 
outside sources of financing, trade credit (TRCREDIT) and lease financing (LEASING); dividend 
payout (PAYOUT); and variables to control for firm size (SALES), age of the company (COMPAGE), 
and the type of firm (TRADING), a 0-1 dummy variable with value equal to 1 if the company is 
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publicly-owned. 
A priori, we expect ownership differences (OWNERS and SHLDNUM) to have a significant 
bearing on debt ratios. We hypothesize that family-owned firms would have smaller debt proportions 
owing to their conservative attitude toward risk and greater information asymmetry faced by creditors. 
At the other extreme, firms that are widely-owned may be perceived as better credit risks and may 
have less informational asymmetry. Therefore, widely-held firms are likely have higher debt ratios. 
The univariate analysis in Panel A of Table 3 showed a pattern of debt ratios consistent with our 
expectation even though the Chi-Square test statistics were not statistically significant. We expect 
positive coefficients for both the ownership variables, OWNERS and SHLDNUM.  
The CEO is the most important person in corporations, more so in privately owned businesses 
owing to her/his dual influence through high ownership stakes and management roles. We believe that 
lenders would view the CEO’s stock ownership (CEOSTK) and the length of total experience of CEO 
in the firm (CEOEXP) as positive factors in extending credit to the firm. The CEOs with larger 
stockholdings would have their interests more closely aligned with the stockholder interests and they 
may use more debt financing if it leads to value enhancements (Mehran, Taggart, and Yermack, 
(1999). Further, using debt rather than external equity will enable the CEO to maintain better control 
over the firm. If these arguments hold, we should find a positive association between DEBTRAT and 
CEOSTK and CEOEXP. However, there is a possibility that the CEO’s longevity in the firm may be 
indicative of entrenchment possibilities. Researchers argue that entrenched managers may use less 
debt in order to reduce the risk associated with their undiversified human capital (Fama, 1980), or for 
the fear of not achieving the level of performance required to meet debt related obligations (Jensen, 
1986).  
A recent study by Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) examined the relationship between 
managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions. Their findings show that CEO stock 
ownership is positively related to debt leverage, whereas CEO tenure is negatively related to debt 
leverage. They rationalize the positive sign for CEO stock ownership as a result of managerial 
incentive to realize more value for their stockholdings from value-increasing leverage. On the other 
hand, CEOs with longer tenures were able to increase equity values by their high quality management 
which resulted in reduced leverage. It will be interesting to see if the evidence in Berger, Ofek, and 
Yermack (1997) paper holds for small firms. 
The next set of variables in the regression equation relate to three financial policy variables which 
could have a bearing on debt ratios. The first two variables, trade credit (TRCREDIT) and lease 
financing (LEASING) reflect alternate sources of financing. The third variable, dividend payout ratio 
(PAY0UT), reflects cash outflows that compete with interest/principal obligations on debt financing. 
Trade credit is a spontaneous source of financing and it has no explicit interest cost. Firms with low 
credit risk may receive generous trade credit from their suppliers and such firms would have less 
reliance on other sources of debt. If this hypothesis holds, TRCREDIT will have a negative coefficient. 
Alternatively, firms that are viewed positively by their suppliers may also be favored by banks and 
other lenders for credit extension. If this explanation holds, we will find a positive coefficient for 
TRCREDIT. In a recent paper, Cook (1999) shows that suppliers of trade credit support the role of 
financial intermediaries in overcoming the informational asymmetry about small firms. Using a survey 
sample of Russian small firms, he finds that firms using trade credit have a higher probability of 
acquiring bank credit. TRCREDIT is measured as a qualitative variable on a Lichert scale to indicate 
its relative importance to the firm (1 = Least important; .... 5 = Most important). As such, we do not 
suspect any potential spurious relationship between TRCREDIT and DEBTRAT to distort the 
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empirical verification that we are seeking between the two variables. 
Leasing is an important source of financing for privately-owned firms owing to their limited access 
to debt markets. Also, Bathala and Mukherjee (1995) argue that small firms are reluctant to make 
long-term commitment of funds by purchasing assets owing to their greater vulnerability to changing 
technologies. Several prior studies (for example, Marston and Harris, 1988; Mukherjee, 1991; Bathala 
and Mukherjee, 1995; and Deloof and Verschueren, 1999) have examined the relationship between 
leasing and debt financing in firms and found mixed results with respect to whether they are 
substitutes or complements of each other. Specifically, Mukherjee’s survey of Fortune 500 companies 
found a substitute relationship between debt and leasing, whereas Bathala and Mukherjee’s survey of 
small firms found a complementary relationship between the two. 
Dividend payments are cash outflows, similar to interest payments on debt. Small businesses, 
especially private firms, need to conserve cash because of their limitations in raising external capital 
for operating and growth needs. Since dividend payments compete with the interest expense on debt, 
companies with higher debt ratios (and high interest costs) may have a diminished ability to pay 
dividends. We would therefore expect a negative association between PAYOUT and DEBTRAT.  
Firm size is proxied by SALES and it is expected to capture the differential credit and bankruptcy 
risks among firms differing in size. As larger firms are perceived to be better risks, we anticipate a 
positive relationship between DEBTRAT and SALES. The company’s age (COMPAGE) is a stability 
factor. The length of time the company has been in operation is indicative of its ability to withstand the 
ups and downs of economic cycles and its potential for survival in the future. We believe that the 
longevity of small firms, especially owing to information limitations, provides a positive “signal” to 
lenders and enhances their debt capacity. On this assumption, we expect a positive coefficient for 
COMPAGE. The analysis in Berger and Udell (1998) shows that capital structure in small businesses 
varies with firm size and age.  
Finally, TRADING is a 0-1 dummy variable with the value equal to 1 if the firm is publicly-owned 
or 0 if the firm is privately-owned. Considering the advantages of publicly available information and 
liquidity associated with public firms, we expect that lenders will be more willing to provide debt 
financing to them than to private firms. Therefore, we predict a positive relationship between 
DEBTRAT and TRADING. 
Discussion of Regression Results. The results from the regression equation specified above (Model 
1) are presented in Table 4.  In all 179 firms had the data for all variables in the regression equation. 
The estimated regression model has an F-Value of 6.75 that is highly significant at the 1 percent level 
and an adjusted R-Squared value of 0.2440. Considering the fact that it is a cross-sectional regression, 
the model’s explanatory power is quite reasonable. The parameter estimates of all but three 
explanatory variables are statistically significant and most of them have signs in the direction of our 
predictions. All Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are less than three, indicative of no potential multi-
collinearity among the independent variables. 
The parameter estimate for OWNERS is not statistically significant indicating no association 
between debt ratios and ownership differences in small firms. This finding is consistent with the 
results from univariate analysis using ChiSquared tests (See Panel A, 8Table 3)However, the second 
measure of ownership attribute, the number of shareholders (SHLDNUM), is positively related to 
DEBTRAT as indicated by the statistical significance of its coefficient at the 5% level. The regression 
coefficients for CEO attributes (CEOSTK and CEOEXP) are highly significant with p-values better 
than 0.01. The positive association between CEOSTK and DEBTRAT is consistent with the Leland 
and Pyle (1977) arguments that the fraction of ownership kept by the entrepreneur is indicative of the 
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magnitude of informational asymmetry about the firm, and it influences the willingness of outsiders to 
provide capital to the firm. The CEO’s length of total experience (CEOEXP), however, is negatively 
related to DEBTRAT. The negative coefficient for CEOEXP is consistent with Fama (1980) and 
Jensen (1986) arguments concerning entrenchment effects associated with the longer tenure of 
managers. Our findings of the relation of CEOSTK and CEOEXP with debt leverage for small firms 
are similar to the results for large firms obtained by Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) and Mehran, 
Taggart, and Yermack (1999). 
The coefficients for TRCREDIT and LEASING are positive and statistically significant with p-
values of 0.0390 and <0.0001, respectively. The positive relationship between TRCREDIT and 
DEBTRAT seems to suggest that the firms that are viewed positively by their suppliers are also 
favored by other lenders. The positive relationship between LEASING and DEBTRAT indicates that 
they are complementary to each other and this evidence supports previous findings by Bathala and 
Mukherjee (1996), and Mehran, Taggart, and Yermack (1999). From this evidence, it appears that debt 
usage builds up the firm’s credit rating and provides a positive “signal” to lessors. Further, greater 
monitoring by lenders reduces the lessors’ monitoring costs. In sum, information, signaling, and 
monitoring advantages seem to drive the complementary relationship between debt and lease financing 
in small firms.  
The dividend payout (PAYOUT) is not a significant factor in the determination of small firms’ 
debt ratios. At best, there is a very weak negative association between the two considering the p-value 
of 0.1687 for the regression coefficient of PAYOUT variable. Perhaps, dividend payments does not 
constitute a major claim dilution factor for lenders of small firms (especially privately-owned) as they 
tend to payout little, if any, in dividends. In order to verify this assertion, we examined the distribution 
of firms paying dividends versus not paying dividends. A total of 229 firms provided responses to this 
question. Out of them 120 firms (52.4%) do not pay dividends and the distribution of no-dividend 
firms is about the same for both private and public groups. Among those paying dividends, 74 firms 
(32.3%) pay utmost 25% of earnings in dividends.  
In regard to the other variables in the regression equation, we find that SALES has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient (p-value = 0.004) indicating that larger firms tend to have higher 
debt ratios. As discussed before, firm size is generally viewed as a proxy for business risk and larger 
firms are assumed to be less risky. The evidence is consistent with this notion and also with the results 
found by Mehran, Taggart, and Yermack (1999). The age of the company (COMPAGE) is not an 
influencing factor in the determination of debt ratios. Finally, the TRADING dummy variable (0 = 
private firms with no trading in company’s stock; 1 = public firms with trading in company’s stock) 
has a negative coefficient that is statically significant (p-value = 0.0285). This indicates that, on 
average, public firms have smaller debt ratios than private firms. This finding is different from our 
expectation that public firms would have higher debt ratios owing to their liquidity and information 
advantages relative to private firms. However, it appears that public firms are able to meet much of 
their capital needs through equity financing especially in view of their access to capital markets 
thereby relying less on debt capital. This can be verified from Table 2, which shows that equity from 
outside investors is the most important source of capital whereas it ranks among the lowest for private 
firms. Privately owned firms, on the other hand, would have limited access to equity capital, both 
internal and external. Their limitation in raising equity stems from the smaller number of owners and 
their wealth constraints. With respect to external equity, they have disadvantages of illiquidity, 
information deficiency, and lack of publicly issued stock. The negative coefficient for TRADING is 
consistent with these arguments. 
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As stated earlier, we do not suspect any spurious relationship between TRCREDIT and DEBTRAT 
potentially clouding the findings from the estimated regression equation (Model 1). However, in order 
to ensure that there is no semblance of improper empirical modeling we have estimated the regression 
excluding the TRCREDIT variable from the model (Model 2). The results are presentd in Table 2 
(Model 2). Apparently, deletion of TRCREDIT has led to a decline in the regression’s explanatory 
power in addition to a change in the statistical significance of a couple of explanatory variables. 
Otherwise, the parameter estimates of explanatory variables and their respective standard errors 
remained pretty stable with no changes in their signs. 
 
IV. Conclusions and Implications 
This research is based on a survey of small businesses in the U.S. The paper analyzes differences 
in the ownership structure and corporate financial policies of small firms, both private and public. The 
survey results show that ownership and management are highly concentrated in small firms. On 
average, the CEOs of private firms own a much a larger percentage of equity ownership than the CEOs 
of public firms. However, the proportion of executives and directors who own common stock in public 
firms is far greater than in private firms. This suggests the importance of stock ownership in mitigating 
equity agency costs in public firms as opposed to private firms. Within private firms, the CEO’s equity 
ownership declines as the ownership structure moves from family-owned to widely-held. By and large, 
compared to public firms, private firms have a larger percentage of CEOs who are the largest 
shareholders. In 75.5% of private firms (compared to only 10% of public firms) insiders (officers and 
directors) own 50% or more of the firm’s common stock. In regard to the different sources of capital, 
both private and public firms are alike in the use of top two sources of capital – (1) loans/lines of 
credit from banks and (2) equity capital from current stockholders. Trade credit is the third most 
important source of capital for private firms and it is equity from outside investors for public firms. 
Venture capital and SBA financing rank at the very bottom for both groups. These differences are 
apparently due to the factors such as informational asymmetry, illiquidity, and agency costs that differ 
by the ownership structure. 
In debt financing, over 86% of firms (public or private) have debt ratios of 50% or smaller. The 
ownership differences are not statistically significant. Both types of firms predominantly rely upon 
bank loans for debt capital, with 76.4% of private firms and 56.1% of public firms using bank loans as 
their primary source of credit. The difference between the two groups lies in the use of trade credit and 
other sources of debt. A larger percentage of private firms (13.9%) use trade credit as the primary 
source of debt compared to 7.3% of public firms. Other sources of debt appears to more important for 
public firms (36.6%) than for private firms (10.2%). Private firms and public firms differ in sources of 
debt, but there are no significant differences between the different ownership groups within the private 
firms.  
In maturity structure, private firms tend to rely more on short-term debt and public firms tend to 
rely more on long-term debt. The data indicate a heavier use of short-term debt by family-owned and 
closely-owned firms. In terms of borrowing costs, on average, private firms tend to pay more than 
public firms. A larger proportion of private firms (41.2%) pay interest above the prime rate compared 
to only 28.2% of public firms. Further, a larger proportion of public firms (52.2%) are able to borrow 
at rates less than the prime rate compared to only 20.9% of private firms. The ownership differences 
within the sub-groups of private firms also matter. A larger proportion of widely-held firms (50%) are 
able to borrow at rates less than the prime rate, where as only 17.2% of family-owned firms are able to 
borrow at rates less than the prime rate. On average, secured debt is more commonly used, irrespective 
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of whether the firm is public or private. However, 66.% of private firms have majority of their debt as 
secured, compared to 55% for public firms. Among private firms, greater proportions of family-owned 
and closely-owned firms, relative to widely-owned firms, have majority of their holdings in secured 
form. The analyses of debt maturity structure and cost of debt in relation to the level of debt (debt 
ratio) show differences in that firms with low debt levels use more short-term debt and have lower 
debt costs. 
The evidence from regression analysis suggests that debt ratios differ by the type of ownership 
(private versus public), the dispersion of stock ownership (the number of shareholders), the CEO 
attributes (stock ownership and experience), alternative sources of financing (trade credit and lease 
finance), and the company size (sales). On average, private firms have higher debt ratios than public 
firms, debt ratios increase with firm size, and debt and lease financing are complementary sources of 
financing. While debt leverage is positively associated with the CEO stock ownership, it is negatively 
related to the CEO’s total experience in the firm. Although the dividend variable is not statistically 
significant, it has a weak negative association with the amount of debt capital in the firm. 
The study provides important implications for small business finance. The findings are valuable to 
the owners and managers of small firms (both private and public) and the providers of capital to those 
firms, especially suppliers trade credit and banks. Owning to the highly concentrated ownership and 
duality between ownership and control in private firms, minority shareholders and providers of outside 
capital should be watchful of the potential for diversion of cash flows and weakening in property 
rights. Further, in order to attract outside capital, small firm CEOs and other insiders should contribute 
more of their own capital. Small firms, especially privately-owned, should emphasize maintaining 
excellent relationships with their suppliers trade credit and bankers as it would improve their ability to 
receive financing from those two primary sources of capital on better terms and lower costs. By having 
a better understanding of the factors contributing for differences in ownership concentrations, 
incentive structures, and sources capital, managers (or owner-managers) of small firms will be better 
able to structure the nexus of contracts and financial policies that can best serve the collective interests 
of both passive and active owners. 
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Table 1 : Analysis of Sources of Capital 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources of Capital 
 
Privately-Owned Firms 
 
 
Public 
Firms 
 
Family 
Owned 
 
Closely 
Held 
 
Widely 
Held 
 
Overall: 
Private Firms 
 
Equity from current stockholders 
 
       3.09 (2) 
 
     3.15 (2) 
 
     3.00 (2) 
 
     3.10 (2) 
 
    3.31 (2) 
 
Equity from outside investors 
 
       1.30 
 
     1.22 
 
      1.36 
 
     1.28 
 
    3.24 (3) 
 
Loans from stockholders/directors 
 
       2.27 (4) 
 
     1.78 (4) 
 
      1.18 
 
     2.07 (4) 
 
1.42 
 
Loans/credit lines from banks 
 
       3.91 (1) 
 
     4.00 (1) 
 
     3.92 (1) 
 
     3.92 (1) 
 
     3.49 (1) 
 
Loans from other sources 
 
       1.65 
 
     1.49 
 
     2.36  
 
     1.65 
 
2.00 
 
Trade credit 
 
       3.00 (3) 
 
     2.50 (3) 
 
     2.45 (4) 
 
     2.87 (3) 
 
2.24 
 
SBA financing 
 
       1.29 
 
     1.12 
 
      1.45 
 
     1.25 
 
1.07 
 
Venture capital 
 
       1.27 
 
     1.06 
 
      1.18 
 
     1.20 
 
1.18 
 
Other sources 
 
       1.71 
 
     1.73 
 
     2.60 (3) 
 
     1.78 
 
     2.29 (4) 
 
Note: The cell values are the average values of the responses: 1 - least Important ....... 5 = Most Important 
The values in parentheses are the ranks for the top four sources of financing within the respective 
 ownership category. 
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Table 2 : Analysis of Lease Financing 
 
 
Panel A: Ownership Differences in Lease Financing – Number of Firms (Row Percentages) 
 
 
Ownership Type  
 
Percentage of Assets Financed with Leases 
 
0 percent 
 
1-10 percent 
 
> 10 percent 
 
Row Totals 
 
Family Owned 
 
60   (49.1%) 
 
  52   (42.6%) 
 
10   (8.2%) 
 
122   (100%) 
 
Closely Held 
 
 32   (58.2%) 
 
   16   (29.1%) 
 
   7   (12.7%) 
 
  55   (100%) 
 
Widely Held 
 
 5    (35.7%) 
 
   5   (35.7%) 
 
   4   (28.6%) 
 
 14   (100%) 
 
Overall: Private Firms 
 
 97   (50.8%) 
 
73   (38.2%) 
 
21  (11.0%) 
 
191   (100%) 
 
             Public Firms 
 
15   (31.2%) 
 
 27   (56.3%) 
 
  6   (12.5%) 
 
  48   (100%) 
 
Note: Differences within private firms:  Chi-Square =     8.07 p-value = 0.0889 
  Differences between private vs. public: Chi-Square =     6.34 p-value = 0.0420 
       
 
 
Panel B: Use of Debt and Lease Financing — Number of Firms (Row Percentages) 
 
Percentage of Assets 
Financed with Debt 
 
Percentage of Assets Financed with Leases 
 
0 percent 
 
1 - 10 percent 
 
> 10 percent 
 
Row Totals 
 
0 percent 
 
31   (77.5%) 
 
  8   (20.0%) 
 
  1   (2.5%) 
 
  40   (100%) 
 
1 - 10 percent 
 
28   (63.6%) 
 
12   (27.3%) 
 
  4   (9.1%) 
 
  44   (100%) 
 
> 10 percent 
 
34   (34.0%) 
 
50  (50.0%) 
 
16   (16%) 
 
100   (100%) 
 
Overall: Private Firms 
 
93   (50.5%)  
 
70  (38.0%) 
 
21   (11.4%) 
 
184   (100%) 
 
             Public Firms 
 
15   (31.2%) 
 
 27   (56.3%) 
 
  6   (12.5%) 
 
  48   (100%) 
 
       Note: Differences within private firms:  Chi-Square =     26.02 p-value = <0.0001 
  Differences between private vs. public: Chi-Square =       6.34 p-value =   0.0420 
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Table  3 : Analysis of Debt Structure 
 
 
Panel  A : Ownership Differences and Debt Ratios  —  Number of Firms (Row Percentages) 
 
Ownership Type 
 
10 % or Less  
 
 10.1 - 50.0 % 
 
> 50.0 % 
 
Row Totals 
 
Family Owned 
 
53   (44.1%) 
 
50   (41.7%) 
 
17   (14.2%) 
 
120    (100%) 
 
Closely Held 
 
27   (49.1%) 
 
 21   (38.2%) 
 
7    (12.7%) 
 
55     (100%) 
 
Widely Held 
 
 7    (50.0%) 
 
 6    (42.9%) 
 
1     (7.1%) 
 
14     (100%) 
 
Overall: Private Firms 
 
87     (46.1%) 
 
77    (40.7%) 
 
25    (13.2%) 
 
189    (100%) 
 
             Public Firms 
 
23     (46.0%) 
 
 20     (40.0%) 
 
7   (14.0%) 
 
  50    (100%) 
 
Note:  Differences within private firms:                Chi-Square = 4.269 p-value = 0.8321 
              Differences between private vs. public: Chi-Square = 1.498 p-value = 0.8270  
           
 
 
 
Panel B : Ownership Differences and Source of Debt — Number of Firms (Row Percentages) 
 
Ownership Type 
 
Trade Credit 
 
Bank Loans 
 
Other Sources 
 
Row Total 
 
Family Owned 
 
15 (13.8%) 
 
82 (75.2%) 
 
12 (11.0%) 
 
109 (100%) 
 
Closely Held 
 
 7 (16.3%) 
 
34 (79.1%) 
 
2 (4.6%) 
 
43 (100%) 
 
Widely Held 
 
1 (7.7%) 
 
10 (76.9%) 
 
 2 (15.4%) 
 
13 (100%) 
 
Overall: Private Firms 
 
23 (13.9%) 
 
126 (76.4%) 
 
17 (10.2%) 
 
165 (100%) 
 
             Public Firms 
 
3 (7.3%) 
 
23 (56.1%) 
 
15 (36.6%) 
 
  41 (100%) 
 
Note: Differences within private firms:   Chi-Square =   2.35 p-value = 0.6714 
Differences between private vs. public: Chi-Square = 17.35 p-value = 0.0002 
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Table  3 : Analysis of Debt Structure, continued 
 
 
 
Panel C : Ownership Differences and Debt Maturity — Number of Firms (Row Percentages) 
 
Ownership Type 
 
Short Term 
 
Medium Term 
 
Long Term 
 
Row Total 
 
Family Owned 
 
49 (47.1%) 
 
30 (28.8%) 
 
25 (24.1%) 
 
104 (100%) 
 
Closely Held 
 
26 (56.6%) 
 
10 (21.7%) 
 
10 (21.7%) 
 
 46 (100%) 
 
Widely Held 
 
 4 (33.3%) 
 
5 (41.7%) 
 
 3 (25.0%) 
 
12 (100% 
 
Overall: Private Firms 
 
79 (48.8%) 
 
45 (27.8%) 
 
38 (23.5%) 
 
162 (100%) 
 
             Public Firms 
 
15 (34.1%) 
 
12 (27.3%) 
 
17 (38.6%) 
 
 44 (100%) 
 
Note: Differences within private firms:   Chi-Square =   2.78 p-value = 0.5959 
Differences between private vs. public: Chi-Square =   4.74 p-value = 0.0934 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D :   Ownership Differences and Cost of Debt  —  Number of Firms (Row Percentages) 
 
Ownership Type 
 
Below Prime 
Rate 
 
At Prime  
Rate 
 
Above Prime 
Rate 
 
Row  
Total 
 
Family Owned 
 
20 (17.2%) 
 
50 (43.1%) 
 
46 (39.7%) 
 
116 (100%) 
 
Closely Held 
 
11 (22.9%) 
 
14 (29.2%) 
 
23 (47.9%) 
 
48 (100%) 
 
Widely Held 
 
 6 (50.0%) 
 
  3 (23.1%) 
 
4 (30.8%) 
 
13 (100%) 
 
Overall: Private Firms 
 
37 (20.9%) 
 
67 (37.9%) 
 
73 (41.2%) 
 
177 (100%) 
 
            Public Firms 
 
24 (52.2%) 
 
  9 (19.6%) 
 
13 (28.2%) 
 
  46 (100%) 
 
Note: Differences within private firms:   Chi-Square =     8.29 p-value = 0.0816 
Differences between private vs. public: Chi-Square =   18.05 p-value = 0.0001 
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Table  3 : Analysis of Debt Structure, continued 
 
 
Panel E : Debt Ratios and Debt Maturity  — Number of Firms (Row Percentages) 
 
Debt Ratio 
 
Short-term 
 
Medium-term 
 
Long-term 
 
Row Totals 
 
< = 10 percent 
 
38 (65.5%) 
 
13 (22.4%) 
 
  7  (12.1%) 
 
58  (100%) 
 
10.1 - 50.0 percent 
 
31 (40.8%) 
 
21 (27.6%) 
 
 24  (31.6%) 
 
  76   (100%) 
 
> 50.0 percent 
 
8  (32.0%) 
 
11 (44.0%) 
 
   6  (24.0%) 
 
  25   (100%) 
 
Overall: Private Firms 
 
77  (48.4%) 
 
45 (28.3%) 
 
37  (23.3%) 
 
159  (100%) 
 
             Public Firms 
 
15 (34.1%) 
 
12 (27.3%) 
 
 17   (38.6%) 
 
  44  (100%) 
 
Note: Differences within private firms:   Chi-Square =   14.09 p-value = 0.0070 
Differences within private firms:   Chi-Square =     4.74 p-value = 0.0934 
 
 
 
 
Panel F : Debt Ratios and Cost of Debt  — Number of Firms (Row Percentages) 
 
Debt Ratio 
 
Below Prime 
Rate 
 
At Prime  
Rate 
 
Above Prime 
Rate 
 
Row  
Totals 
 
< = 10 percent 
 
14   (20.6%) 
 
  34   (50.0%) 
 
20    (29.4%) 
 
68   (100%) 
 
10.1 - 50.0 percent 
 
 17   (22.1%) 
 
   29    (37.7%) 
 
31    (40.2%) 
 
 77    (100%) 
 
> 50.0 percent 
 
 5    (19.2%) 
 
   4   (15.4%) 
 
 17    (65.4%) 
 
 26   (100%) 
 
Overall: Private Firms 
 
 36    (21.0%) 
 
67   (39.2%) 
 
68     (39.8%) 
 
171   (100%) 
 
             Public Firms 
 
24    (52.2%) 
 
  9   (19.6%) 
 
 13     (28.2%) 
 
  46   (100%) 
 
Note: Differences within private firms:   Chi-Square =     12.05 p-value = 0.0170 
Differences within private firms:   Chi-Square =     18.05 p-value = 0.0001 
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Table 4 :  Regression Analysis : Cross-sectional Variation in Debt Ratios 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Debt Ratio (DEBTRAT) 
 
 
VARIABLE 
 
Model 1  (n =179) 
 
Model 2  (n=197) 
 
Parameter 
Estimate 
 
Standard  
Error 
 
Parameter 
Estimate 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
INTERCEPT 
 
 0.577     
 
0.709 
 
1.597**  
 
0.659 
 
OWNERS 
 
 0.118      
 
0.151 
 
0.027     
 
0.146 
 
SHLDNUM 
 
 0.104**   
 
0.050 
 
0.041     
 
0.044 
 
CEOSTK 
 
 0.013*** 
 
0.004 
 
  0.011*** 
 
0.004 
 
CEOEXP 
 
-0.024***  
 
0.008 
 
-0.024*** 
 
0.007 
 
TRCREDIT 
 
 0.138**    
 
0.066 
 
------ 
 
----- 
 
LEASING 
 
 0.640***  
 
0.138 
 
0.546*** 
 
0.119 
 
PAYOUT 
 
-0.105        
 
0.076 
 
-0.103       
 
0.074 
 
SALES 
 
 0.205***  
 
0.070 
 
  0.202***  
 
0.067 
 
COMPAGE 
 
 0.064         
 
0.091 
 
0.049     
 
0.088 
 
TRADING 
 
-0.881**     
 
0.399 
 
-0.514      
 
0.363 
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Table 4 :  Regression Analysis : Cross-sectional Variation in Debt Ratios 
continued 
 
 
 
Model F Value 
Adjusted R-Squared 
Vairance Infl. Factors 
Statistical Significance 
 
     6.76*** 
0.2440 
All Values < 3 
***1percent; **5 percent  
 
     5.82*** 
0.1814 
All Values < 3  
***1percent; **5 percent  
 
Variable 
 
Measurement  
 
DEBTRAT 
 
1 = 0%;     2 = 1-10%;      3 = 11-25%;      4 = 26-50%;     5 = 51-75%;      6 = >75% 
 
OWNERS 
 
1 = One person owned; 2 = Family owned; 3 = Closely held; 4 = Widely held. 
 
SHLDNUM 
 
Log of the number of shareholders. 
 
CEOSTK 
 
The percentage of common stock owned by the CEO. 
 
CEOEXP 
 
The length of CEO’s total experience in the firm. 
 
TRCREDIT 
 
1 = Lease important; ..... 5 = Most important. 
 
LEASING 
 
1 = 0%;     2 = 1-10%;      3 = 11-25%;      4 = 26-50%;     5 = 51-75%;      6 = >75% 
 
PAYOUT 
 
1 = 0%;     2 = 1-10%;      3 = 11-25%;      4 = 26-50%;     5 = 51-75%;      6 = >75% 
 
SALES 
 
1 = <= $25 m;   2 = $26-50 m;   3 = $51-100 m; 4 = $101-250 m;   5 = $251-500 m 
6 = $501 m - 1 b; 7 = $1.1- 5 b;   8 = $5.1-10 b;   9 = >$10 b 
 
COMPAGE 
 
1 = 1-5 yrs;   2 = 6-10 yrs;   3 = 11-25 yrs;   4 = 26-50 yrs;   5 = 51-75 yrs;   6 = > 75 yrs. 
 
TRADING 
 
Dummy variable; 1 = If the company’s stock is publicly trading; 0 otherwise. 
 
 
